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Mason Howard
Mason Howard

Mini Weapons Of Mass Destruction 2: Build A Sec...

The key to becoming an accomplished marksman is to practice, practice, practice. MiniWeapons of Mass Destruction Targets contains more than 100 tear-out targets to develop your skills. The targets are divided into three themes--Basic, Secret Agent, and Dark Ages--with a variety of gameplay scenarios. Blast the lock off a chained door, knock down a castle gate, compete in a game of Around the World, or shoot several miniature targets at various locations. Rules on the back of each target describe basic and advanced play. In addition to the 100+ targets, MiniWeapons master John Austin provides instructions for building five new MiniWeapons perfect for target shooting: Safety instructions are also included, as well as a guide to setting up an in-house firing range that will protect walls and furniture.

Mini Weapons of Mass Destruction 2: Build a Sec...

The most striking feature of the Soviet programme was that it remained secret for such a long time. During the Second World War, the Soviets used a simple trick to check whether US researchers were occupied with secret research: they monitored whether American physicists were publishing their results. Indeed, they were not, and the conclusion was, correctly, that the US was busy building a nuclear bomb (Rhodes, 1988, pp. 327 and 501). The same trick could have revealed the Soviet bioweapons programme much earlier (Fig. 2). With the collapse of the Soviet Union, most of these programmes were halted and the research centres abandoned or converted for civilian use. Nevertheless, nobody really knows what the Russians are working on today and what happened to the weapons they produced. Western security experts now fear that some stocks of biological weapons might not have been destroyed and have instead fallen into other hands (Alibek & Handelman, 1999; Miller et al., 2002). According to US intelligence, South Africa, Israel, Iraq and several other countries have developed or still are developing biological weapons (Zilinskas, 1997; Leitenberg, 2001).

We are witnessing a renewed interest in biological warfare and terrorism owing to several factors, including the discovery that Iraq has been developing biological weapons (Zilinskas, 1997), several bestselling novels describing biological attacks, and the anthrax letters after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. As history tells us, virtually no nation with the ability to develop weapons of mass destruction has abstained from doing so. And the Soviet project shows that international treaties are basically useless unless an effective verification procedure is in place. Unfortunately, the same knowledge that is needed to develop drugs and vaccines against pathogens has the potential to be abused for the development of biological weapons (Fig. 4; Finkel, 2001). Thus, some critics have suggested that information about potentially harmful pathogens should not be made public but rather put into the hands of 'appropriate representatives' (Danchin, 2002; Wallerstein, 2002). A recent report on anti-crop agents was already self-censored before publication, and journal editors now recommend special scrutiny for sensitive papers (Mervis & Stokstad, 2002; Cozzavelli, 2003; Malakoff, 2003). Whether or not such measures are useful deterrents might be questionable, because the application of available knowledge is clearly enough to kill. An opposing view calls for the imperative publication of information about the development of biological weapons to give scientists, politicians and the interested public all the necessary information to determine a potential threat and devise countermeasures.

The United States faces a rising danger from terrorists and rogue states seeking to use weapons of mass destruction. A weapon of mass destruction is a nuclear, radiological, chemical, biological, or other device that is intended to harm a large number of people. The Department of Homeland Security works every day to prevent terrorists and other threat actors from using these weapons to harm Americans.

Terrorists are, on the whole, conventional in their use of weapons; bombs and guns are their favourites. Among the former, car- and truck-bombs have become very powerful weapons, especially in suicide attacks. Terrorists use both explosive bombings and incendiary bombings (e.g. Molotov cocktails). They also make use of letter and parcel bombs. Terrorists use guns, pistols, revolvers, rifles and (semi-) automatic weapons in assassinations, sniping, armed attacks and massacres. Grenades - from hand grenades to rocket-propelled - are also part of the terrorist arsenal. The use of missiles is rare but a few groups are known to be in possession of surface-to-air shoulder-fired missiles that can bring down helicopters, fighter aircrafts and civilian airliners.

Subsequent to George W. Bush's assumption of the presidency in January 2001, the U.S. made it clear that it would not accept what had become the status quo with respect to Iraq - a country ruled by Saddam Hussein and free to attempt to reconstitute its assorted weapons of mass destruction programs. As part of their campaign against the status quo, which included the clear threat of the eventual use of military force against the Iraqi regime, the U.S. and Britain published documents and provided briefings detailing their conclusions concerning Iraq's WMD programs and its attempts to deceive other nations about those programs.

As U.S. forces moved through Iraq, there were initial reports that chemical or biological weapons might have been uncovered, but closer examinations produced negative results. In May 2003, the Bush administration decided to establish a specialized group of about 1,500 individuals, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), to search the country for WMD - replacing the 75th Exploitation Task Force, which had originally been assigned the mission. Appointed to lead the Group, whose motto is "find, exploit, eliminate," was Maj. Gen. Keith Dayton, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Operations. In June, David Kay, who served as a U.N. weapons inspector after Operation Desert Storm, was appointed special advisor and traveled to Iraq to lead the search. (Note 4)

By the time of the creation of the ISG, and continuing to the date of this publication, a controversy has existed over the performance of U.S. (and British) intelligence in collecting and evaluating information about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs. The reliability of sources has been questioned. It has been suggested that some human intelligence may have been purposeful deception by the Iraqi intelligence and security services, while exiles and defectors may have provided other intelligence seeking to influence U.S. policy.

The quality of the intelligence analysis has also come under scrutiny. The failure to find weapons stocks or active production lines, undermining claims by the October 2002 NIE and both President Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell (Document 16, Document 27), has been one particular cause for criticism. Controversy has also centered around specific judgments - in the United States with regard to assessments of Iraq's motives for seeking high-strength aluminum tubes, and in the United Kingdom with respect to the government's claim that Iraq sought to acquire uranium from Africa. Post-war evaluation of captured material, particularly two mobile facilities that the CIA and DIA judged to be biological weapons laboratories, has also been the subject of dispute. (Note 5)

Much that is of interest concerning intelligence and Iraqi weapons of mass destruction has appeared in articles, monographs, and studies published by magazines or research groups. A list of key publications is provided immediately after the notes section. Other important materials have been posted temporarily on government web sites. The documentation provided in this briefing book collects many of the most significant of these records in one place, allowing readers to substantially augment their understanding of the issues by directly comparing the different sources and conclusions, and ensuring that these materials will be accessible for the long term.

Written after the conclusion of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, this CIA survey examined Saddam Hussein's likely regional and international objectives and strategies - including his relations with other Arab states and the PLO, his desire to reduce Iraqi dependence on the USSR, and his goal of preventing closer ties between the US and USSR and Iran. With respect to weapons of mass destruction, the analysis briefly discusses Iraqi attitudes toward chemical and nuclear weapons. The first are considered a "short-term fix," while the latter represent "the long-term deterrent."

Part of one of the report describes the work done by the IAEA, during the period April 1, 1997 to October 1, 1997 in montoring and verifying Iraqi compliance with the nuclear disarmament provisions of U.N. resolution 687 (1991). It includes an extensive summary of the technical discussions between IAEA and Iraq. The second part of the report provides an overview of IAEA activities since 1991 related to on-site inspection of Iraqi's nuclear capabilities and the destruction, removal, or neutralization of Iraqi nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons related material or facilities.

Three pages of this document focus on U.S. charges concerning Iraqi failure to comply with the restrictions pertaining to weapons of mass destruction placed upon it as a result of the Persian Gulf War. It charges, inter alia, that "Iraq is believed to be developing ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers - as prohibited by UN Security Council Resolution 687" and "Iraq has stepped up its quest for nuclear weapons and has embarked on a worldwide hunt for materials to make an atomic bomb." With respect to chemical weapons, it charges that "Iraq has not accounted for hundreds of tons of chemical precursors and tens of thousands of unfilled munitions, including Scud variant missile warheads." 041b061a72


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